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POVERTY AND WELFARE: THE 
GAO REPORT 
From time to time we have reported on the state of the social science research on 
poverty, race, and welfare. The Government Accounting Office recently issued a re-
port summarizing the results of over a hundred studies. • We are reprinting the por-
tion of the report that we believe has the greatest relevance to the on-going debate 
about the welfare system. 
WORK/DEPENDENCY 
It is sometimes charged that welfare removes the need and de-
sire to work. Research indicates the present system has design fea-
tures that could reduce incentives to work. The effect of these 
features on work behavior, however, is unclear. While research 
does not clearly support the contention that welfare creates a disin-
centive to work, it appears that welfare has done little to actively 
encourage work. Legislation passed in 1981, however, has allowed 
states the option of establishing new work programs. We are study-
ing these new work programs to determine how effective they are in 
helping recipients become independent of welfare. Our previous 
work found some work demonstration projects had encouraging re-
sults, but the long-term prospects for reducing welfare dependency, 
and thus the welfare rolls, remain unclear. 
Researchers have found movement on and off AFDC is wide-
spread and that most AFDC recipients depend on welfare for less 
than 8 years. Studies of welfare dependency have centered on 
AFDC recipients and have consistently found that they fall into 
three groups: (1) short-term users (1 to 2 years), (2) moderate users 
(3 to 7 years), and (3) long-term users (8 or more years). Based on a 
single period of time on AFDC, research shows that about one-half 
to two-thirds of all AFDC recipients are short-term users, one-
fourth to one-third are moderate users, and only a few are long-
term users. Research allowing for multiple periods of time on 
AFDC has found that the percentage of long-term users increases 
to about 30 percent of all AFDC recipients. 
The research shows that likely long-term recipients can be pre-
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dieted by certain characteristics, such as never-married status for 
younger women and low education level for older women. For ex-
ample, one researcher found that never-married mothers under age 
26 with a child under three constituted about one-third of all long-
term recipients and they averaged over 10 years on welfare. 
The perceived problems reported in the research of welfare's 
impact on recipient work efforts are 
-welfare with no work requirement allows able-bodied recipients to receive welfare 
rather than work, 
--eligibility and benefit factors of welfare programs create work disincentives, and 
-the system does not adequately address the obstacles preventing recipients from 
becoming independent. 
Researchers have studied these problems by evaluating (1) the im-
pact guaranteed income payments have on work efforts, (2) the ef-
fects on recipient behavior of benefit loss due to earnings, (3) the 
effects of benefits more generous than earnings, and (4) the effective-
ness of work programs designed to reduce dependency. 
IMPACT OF GUARANTEED INCOMES 
Fears that welfare with no work requirement would reduce 
work efforts were supported by the results of a large-scale income 
maintenance experiment run in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Called the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiment, or 
SIME/DIME, and sponsored by the Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare, the experiment tested the thesis that guaranteed 
income payments paid through a "negative income tax" would 
cause recipients to reduce work efforts significantly. A negative in-
come tax payment guarantees a minimum cash income to families 
with no income, and reduces the cash payment according to a speci-
fied tax rate for each dollar of income. 
The experiment consistently showed the guaranteeing income 
reduced work efforts by a small amount. Thus, fears of a sizable 
dependent population created by large-scale withdrawals of the 
working poor from the labor force were discounted. The results of 
the experiment are still debated. One debate centers on the effect 
mandatory work requirements would have had on the experiment's 
outcome. The experiment had no mandatory work or job search 
requirement. One researcher argued that had the experiment in-
cluded a mandatory work requirement, the outcome would have 
shown increased instead of decreased work efforts. 
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EFFECTS OF BENEFIT LOSS DUE TO EARNINGS AND OF 
BENEFITS MORE GENEROUS THAN EARNINGS 
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Researchers argue that welfare may discourage work as a 
result of 
-excessive loss of benefits caused by earned income (high benefit reduction rates), 
-abrupt loss of some benefits rather than a gradual tapering otr (the notch effect), 
and 
-generous benefits that make welfare more attractive than a job. 
Studies provide inconclusive evidence of the effect these perceived 
disincentives have on recipient work efforts. 
Benefit reduction rates are the rates at which welfare benefits 
are lost due to earned income. Researchers argue that high benefit 
reduction rates reduce work efforts because recipients gain very lit-
tle by working. There is a general dilemma over establishing benefit 
levels that provide adequate benefits, keeping benefit reduction rates 
low enough so as not to be a work disincentive, and still keeping 
welfare costs low enough to be politically acceptable. 
The effect of benefit reduction rates is illustrated in table 2-as 
hours worked increase welfare benefits decrease. 
Table 2: 
Benefit Reduction Rates Caused 
by Increased Work (January 1980t 
Weekly average hours of work at minimum wage 
Benefits received Oto!O llto20 21to30 31to40 
Example I 
AFDC, Food Stamp, EITC 
Example 2 
AFDC, Food Stamp, 
34% 44% 44% 51% 
EITC, Public Housing 45% 61% 61% 69% 
• The reduction rates shown here are before changes to the AFDC program by the 1981 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. Under these changes, the reduction rates would 
be higher. 
Source: Congressional Research Service 
The table also illustrates how participating in multiple pro-
grams can result in higher benefit losses. In the second example the 
benefit reduction rate is higher because the recipient is in public 
housing. Earned income reduces benefits in varying amounts in the 
various programs. AFDC benefits are reduced dollar for dollar af-
ter subtracting allowable deductions. Food Stamp benefits are re-
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duced by 30 cents for each dollar of countable earned income. 
Recipients enrolled in more than one program have higher reduc-
tion rates because the same dollar of income reduces benefits in sev-
eral programs. 
Recipients can experience an abrupt loss of benefits rather than 
a gradual tapering off when they increase their earnings. An AFDC 
parent receiving benefits due to unemployment loses all AFDC and 
Medicaid benefits if he or she works 100 or more hours in one 
month. If the parent works 99 hours or less, he or she remains 
eligible for benefits. This is called the "notch effect" because 1 hour 
of work can terminate eligibility. 
Some researchers have suggested that benefits in some jurisdic-
tions may be too generous. A study of the New York City welfare 
system showed that in the early 1970's, the combined benefits from 
AFDC, Medicaid, Food Stamp, and free school lunches were more 
than what could be earned from many of the city's low-skilled jobs. 
WORK REQUIREMENTS 
Since 1981 the focus of AFDC work program policy has 
shifted from passive incentives to active interventions and stringent 
requirements. At that time the administration proposed mandatory 
"workfare," which would have required employable recipients to 
work off their benefits. Instead of a mandatory program, the Con-
gress, through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 and 
subsequent legislation, made workfare and several other approaches 
optional to the states. 
The principal types of programs established were: 
-Work Incentive (WIN) demonstration projects, which usually offer a mixture of 
components, such as education, job search, work experience, classroom, and on-
the-job training. The projects differ from regular WIN programs because they 
are administered by the state AFDC agency rather than the state employment 
agency. They also give the state more flexibility in designing the program. 
-Community Work Experience Program (known as workfare), in which AFDC 
recipients are required to work on public projects in exchange for their AFDC 
benefits. 
-Job Search, which requires participants to look for a job in a structured manner, 
either individually or as part of a group in a "job club." 
-Work Supplementation, sometimes called Grant Diversion, which allows the par-
ticipants' welfare grant to be diverted to subsidize an on-the-job training position, 
often in the private sector, which may become unsubsidized employment. 
The potential of reducing welfare dependency through 
mandatory work requirements is unknown because work demon-
stration projects are in their infancy and few useful evaluations of 
completed projects are available. In an August 1985 report Evi-
dence Is Insufficient to Support the Administration's Proposed 
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Changes to AFDC Work Programs (GAO/HRD-85-92), we re-
ported that while some of 37 projects reviewed showed encouraging 
interim results in enhancing employment and earnings of recipients, 
their success depended partly on such factors as high economic 
growth and adequate financial support, making replication difficult. 
On January 29, 1987, we issued a report on our study of work pro-
grams begun since 1981. 
FAMILY UNIT 
Research does not support the view that welfare encourages 
two-parent families to break up, or that unmarried women have 
children in order to become eligible for benefits. 
ARE FAMILIES ADVERSELY AFFECTED? 
Concerns over welfare's impact on family stability have 
stemmed largely from the single-parent focus of AFDC. The con-
ventional wisdom in the 1970's held the single-parent focus of the 
welfare system might be contributing to marital dissolution. At the 
time, AFDC was largely confined to one-parent families because the 
unemployed father program was not available in every state and, 
where available, was so restrictive that few men participated. It was 
believed that extending coverage to two-parent families would help 
stabilize marriages. Currently about half the states have elected the 
option of providing AFDC to two-parent families when the princi-
pal wage earner is unemployed. 
According to a 1979 report by the University of Wisconsin's 
Institute for Research on Poverty, existing evidence indicates that 
providing aid to two-parent families in the AFDC-Unemployment 
Parent program appeared to actually increase marital instability 
rather than stability. The research did not indicate why. 
Additional concerns about welfare's impact on family stability 
were raised in the 1970's by the Seattle-Denver Income Mainte-
nance Experiment, which provided minimum guaranteed incomes 
to selected families. Initial analysis of the experiment data showed 
that families receiving a guaranteed income-similar to cash wel-
fare payments-had higher dissolution rates than did other families. 
Although Department of Health and Human Services analysts cau-
tioned that the study findings were not clearly understood and may 
not apply to welfare families, many researchers continued to cite the 
experiment as a basis for concern about welfare families' dissolu-
tion. However, recent analysis of the experiment data demon-
strated that the experimental families did not have higher 
dissolution rates. 
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Some researchers assert that welfare contributes to the increas-
ing numbers of unmarried mothers because women with few eco-
nomic prospects can achieve a measure of financial independence by 
having a child. The few studies of this problem, however, indicate 
that welfare has little impact on the childbearing rates of unmarried 
women, even young unmarried women. 
It appears, however, that welfare does affect living arrange-
ments because it gives young mothers an incentive to form their 
own households. Research shows that single mothers in high-bene-
fit states are more likely to live independently, while single mothers 
in low-benefit states who are not living with a partner are likely to 
live in the home of a parent. Research indicates that living at home 
may be better for some single mothers because they are more likely 
to remain in school or go to work. 
